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The Role of China and India in the
G20 and BRICS: Commonalities or
Competitive Behaviour?
Andrew F. COOPER and Asif B. FAROOQ 
Abstract: This paper examines China and India’s relationship within 
the ambit of the G20 process and the autonomous BRICS institution-
al architecture. The evolving relationship of each of these two emerg-
ing powers within these different institutional settings demonstrates a 
degree of agentic commonality and distinction. China’s and India’s 
approaches to both the G20 and the BRICS summit processes high-
light a combination of status-seeking and hedging behaviour. While 
China’s cautious approach is complemented by assertive leadership in 
matters of national interest, India’s leadership has a very specific ori-
entation towards developmental issues. Whereas China’s approach 
focuses on the United States and the rest of the West, India’s ap-
proach is increasingly positioned as a response to China. 
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Introduction 
China and India are most commonly viewed in tandem as the two 
emerging powers with the potential to change the geopolitical order. 
Both exhibit deep frustrations over the way they have been treated 
within the global system. They come to the global governance table 
with a mutual sense of historical grievances and claims, albeit con-
tested (Vieira and Alden 2011), to represent the interests of all devel-
oping countries. They share a neo-Westphalian commitment to state 
sovereignty and non-intervention. They proclaim the need for a rules-
based, stable, and predictable world order that respects the diversity 
of political systems and stages of development. 
China and India were expected to be agents of powerful change 
in multilateral fora for the benefit of the Global South. Neither coun-
try, however, has exhibited any strong desire for revisionism; for 
challenging and altering the status quo of the international order (for 
more, see Johnston 2003). “Coupling” themselves in terms of growth, 
both have benefitted from the process of complex interdependence 
and globalisation in relation to the West. Indeed, the term “Chindia” 
became popular in the early 2000s as a means to differentiate the 
super-sized character of both China and India in the global economy 
(Ramesh 2005). In contrast to the revisionist argument, the two 
emerging powers opted to attempt to reshape the contour of interna-
tional politics by socialising “change” through engaging in and rein-
venting the scopes of informal governance and institutions; the G20 
and BRICS being two prime examples. Indeed, rebutting scepticism 
about the progress of BRICS, the two powers, despite mutual strate-
gic rivalry on regional and global issues, successfully institutionalised 
mutual cooperation in the form of the New Development Bank 
(NDB), and undertook coordinated initiatives on other non-tradition-
al security areas. However, it is apparent that cooperation between 
China and India from within BRICS to beyond the BRICS frame-
work, particularly in influencing the G20 agenda beyond international 
financial governance, is absent and mostly rhetorical and timid at 
best. To address the puzzle of why this is the case, this paper con-
tends that the divergence in the two nations’ leadership roles in seek-
ing status attribution has weakened the prospect for wider and deeper 
cooperation between India and China in the G20 forum.  
To locate this divergence in leadership, we need to first look at 
the common aspects. Both countries adopted cautious, “going along” 
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attitudes to the wave of institutional transition set off by the 2008 
global financial crisis. Membership in the elevated G20 at the leaders’ 
level was accepted with little or no debate by the other members as a 
measure of recognition of India and China’s rising status in the global 
system. At the same time, both countries continued to probe ways to 
go around the established institutional structure, most notably through 
the projection of the BRICS forum which encompasses China and 
India, as well as Russia and Brazil (with the addition of South Africa 
in 2010).  
However, to say that China and India have taken similar posi-
tions in how they have addressed questions of global order is not to 
suggest that there are no nuanced differences between them. On the 
contrary, it is these differences that are as compelling as the similari-
ties between them. Although the cautious or “hedging” (for the defi-
nition of hedging as an “insurance policy,” see Foot 2006) approach 
provided the general framework for the responses of the two coun-
tries, China and India diverged in how and when they sought to carve 
out distinctive agentic spaces for themselves (Sikkink 2011). Such a 
pattern of general commonalities and specific divergences is reinforce-
ed by an assessment of the overall competitive/cooperative design of 
the respective foreign policies of China and India.  
This article examines China and India’s relationship within the 
ambit of the G20 process (a “top table” forum that includes the 
members of the traditional G7 establishment and an array of coun-
tries from the non-West) and the autonomous BRICS institutional 
architecture. Although this relationship continues to evolve, some 
core features stand out. In terms of the methods and motivations for 
how agentic space is carved out, the site and intensity differ between 
China and India. China’s approach to both the G20 and BRICS high-
lights status seeking, with little attention paid to taking a leadership 
role on a start-up basis for functional initiatives. However, China’s 
caution does not mean it simply adopts a hesitant wait-and-see ap-
proach. When pressured by initiatives from other actors, China was 
quick to respond. In the G20, this defensiveness was projected in a 
tactical manner relating to specific pressures coming from the United 
States on issues such as currency valuations and imbalances. Within 
the BRICS nations, China’s repositioning was a consequence of In-
dia’s initiative to create a South-South or BRICS bank. Once pushed 
into action, however, China did not revert back to a “going along” 
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approach. As evidenced by the way it embraced its role as host of the 
G20 in 2016, China’s status-seeking approach became more assertive. 
Even more dramatically, China stalled India’s initiative on the BRICS 
bank, taking over the leadership role itself.  
India’s approach also demonstrates some flexibility within the 
hedging framework. In terms of both the G20 and BRICS, India’s 
leadership had a very specific focus on the issues of economic devel-
opment. In the G20, India showed a willingness far greater than that 
of China to take on some very specific forms of active engagement. 
India co-chaired a functionally-oriented working group. Furthermore, 
at the 2010 Seoul G20 summit, India advocated a more ambitious 
commitment to infrastructure development. However, India’s overall 
commitment to the G20 has been weaker than that of China, mainly 
because of the embedded solidarity India has with the United Na-
tions. Unlike China, India has not moved to host the G20 summit 
process at the leaders’ level. Whereas the locus of China’s defensive-
ness was focused on the United States and the rest of the West, In-
dia’s defensiveness was in response to China. Having taken on the 
leadership role vis-à-vis the BRICS bank, India found itself at an 
explicit disadvantage in terms of diplomatic tools and at a material 
advantage as China took ownership of the initiative.  
To understand the dynamics of the roles of China and India in 
the G20 and BRICS, therefore, it is not enough to locate the two 
countries as twin “emerging” powers potentially challenging the 
United States. There is also a need to locate them both in associative 
terms (in which they cooperate) and as competitors (in which they 
exist as strategic rivals). Some degree of similarity exists in the ap-
proach of the two countries, above all in their defensive styles with 
respect to the G20, but even these defensive styles display important 
divergences. Though somewhat masked by a common membership 
within the self-selective BRICS forum, the differences between China 
and India are evident on a range of issues, leading to a lack of any 
meaningful mutual cooperation in influencing the G20.  
In the following sections, we first highlight the significance of 
China and India as emerging powers within the dynamics of the G20 
and BRICS. We then examine how BRICS as an informal club allows 
some forms of China–India cooperation despite their strategic rivalry. 
Finally, the article analyses the divergence in leadership and strategic 
focus between China and India within the G20, a forum elevated to 
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the leaders’ level in 2008 and designed to be the hub of collective 
efforts on global economic governance issues.  
China and India’s Competing Strategic  
Aspirations
China is poised to become a global power challenging the US domin-
ance (Hu 2011; Subramanian 2011). He and Feng (2012) contend that 
it is “normal” for China to reorient its foreign policy based on chang-
ing national interests for a “peaceful rise,” given that the West makes 
accommodations. Zhang (2010) argues that China’s great power rela-
tionship with the United States, its deepening strategic relations with 
Russia, its increasingly active diplomatic engagement in Southeast 
Asia, its new geopolitical orientation towards safeguarding its eco-
nomic security, and its focus on enhancing soft power increasingly 
demonstrate its emerging status as a global power. What is more 
compelling is China’s assertiveness in terms of its leadership role, as 
observed during the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure In-
vestment Bank (AIIB), in addition to the One Belt, One Road (аᑖ
а䐟, yi dai yi lu) policy. The regional economic potentials from these 
two projects created a significant wave of diplomatic bandwagoning 
in opposition to the US position. More than 20 countries (there are 
currently 57 prospective founding members) joined the China-led 
meeting held on 10 June 2014 in Shanghai to discuss the establish-
ment of the AIIB, which promised to meet Asia’s USD 8 trillion need 
for infrastructure development. Further, in the context of an unfold-
ing security crisis in the South China Sea, Chinese leaders’ sensitivity 
to popular nationalism was also evident and further reinforced Chi-
na’s assertive role (Yahuda 2013; Scobell and Harold 2013) with plaus-
ible counter-productive effects on its regional leadership (Beeson 
2013; Li 2015).  
Given these debates about China’s rise, it is perhaps not surpris-
ing that, since the 2008 global financial crisis, the country has adopted 
a cautious approach to engagement with global institutions. Notwith-
standing the erosion of US/Western influence, China did not move 
quickly or decisively to capitalise operationally on these circum-
stances. Instead of offering up replacement forums as an immediate 
challenge to the status quo, China engaged loosely with the measures 
of institutional adaptation offered up by the older Western establish-
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ment. While China continued to be ambivalent about a leadership 
position (and a shared sense of ownership) in these institutions, it 
continued to engage fully in these institutions.   
At the same time, the recent regional focus of India in Southeast 
Asia and beyond also exposes its emerging role within a competitive 
regional economic and security space shared with China (Pardesi 
2015). In recent years, a broader framework with respect to economic 
regionalism has animated more potential for emerging states and 
India has moved in this direction. Extending Narashimha Rao’s 
“Look East Policy” (Jaffrelot 2003; Chatterjee 2007; Sikri 2009) and 
Vajpayee’s “extended neighbourhood” policy (Scott 2009), India has 
concluded six Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) since 2000: with Thai-
land in 2003, Singapore in 2005, South Korea in 2009, ASEAN in 
2010, Japan in 2011, and Malaysia in 2011. The convergence of eco-
nomic and security incentives, not the least balancing China, served 
as an added incentive with respect to India’s inclusion in several 
ASEAN countries’ forums (Malik 2012: 368–371; Yahya 2005: 397–398). 
In the hard power dimension, India has been sustaining steady 
growth in its military expenditure per capita (USD 9.7 billion in 1991 
and USD 38.1 billion in 2013, compared to China’s expenditure of 
USD 8.7 billion in 1991 and USD 138 billion in 2013; see SIPRI Mili-
tary Expenditure database). India received the status of nuclear power 
in the late twentieth century, and established its new strategic military 
partnership with the United States, what Ganguly and Scobell (2005: 
42–43) call a “healthy relationship.” The removal of Indian defence 
companies from the US Entity List in 2001, the 10-year defence part-
nership known as the “New Framework for the US-India Defense 
Relationship,” and India’s wider range of options for procurement of 
military technologies and enhancing interoperability as a by-product 
of US-Indian joint military drills (Jaffrelot 2009: 3) reveal, at least 
implicitly, a competitive project vis-à-vis the Chinese military force 
(Saalman 2011). Aside from growing economic cooperation, the re-
gional anti-terrorism campaign, sea-lane protection, and balancing 
China’s influence in the South and Southeast Asia are some of the 
converging strategic interests for India and the United States.  
Nonetheless, China’s rapid military modernisation, capitalising 
on its economic growth, has already surpassed India’s military ad-
vancement (Burilkov and Geise 2013: 1047–1051). Indeed, China’s 
growing military and diplomatic power is a security threat to India’s 
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regional aspirations. The countries fought a war against each other 
over their protracted border dispute. The two-week military standoff 
in Ladakh in 2014 further aggravated the two countries’ relations. 
While India’s own foreign policy approach has made substantive 
achievements, its capabilities are yet to match its rising expectations, 
let alone China’s diplomatic prowess (Mansingh 2010). Huang Ya-
sheng (2011) argues that China and India’s relations are fraught with 
more competing issues than their mutually common interests. At the 
same time, under the tutelage of an external alliance, the secondary 
regional powers, Pakistan and Japan, have been engaging actively or 
passively in their respective regional contexts with their powerful 
neighbours India and China on the various fronts of regional affairs, 
often driven by security interests and historical antagonism (Smith 
2013; Ebert, Flemes, and Strüver 2014). The difficult regional security 
context that India has to grapple with in order to advance its regional 
aspiration highlights that India is at a transitional juncture where it is 
struggling “to strike a balance between regional interests and its glo-
bal aspirations – considerations that are not easy to reconcile” 
(Raghavan 2013). This limitation of being in a state of transition is 
also seen in India’s slow progress in regional groups. For example, 
although the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and 
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) finally gained traction due to 
India’s interest (and without the presence of Pakistan), progress has 
been sluggish (Yong and Mun 2009: 35). The idea was first floated by 
Thailand to recompense the structural constraints of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) based on its regional 
security dynamics. Despite BIMSTEC’s strategic linkage with South 
Asia and Southeast Asia (Yahya 2005), it has been slow to develop a 
framework for a FTA (Panda 2014). 
In the economic dimension at the bilateral level, despite increas-
ing trade volumes, coordination between the Chinese and Indian 
economies continues to be a difficult issue. Although they agreed in 
2003 to enhance cooperation and hold regular dialogues on WTO 
negotiations, and despite their common interests and positions, and 
their economic potentials and rhetoric on South–South cooperation, 
economic integration between India and China remains relatively 
weak (Chen and Chen 2010: 114–121). Indeed, the majority of the 
anti-dumping investigations against China were initiated by India 
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alone (accounting for 17 per cent of the total anti-dumping investiga-
tions against China) (Yu 2014: 1254). 
Despite their competitive rivalry, however, the cooperative di-
mension of the China–India relationship can be documented in a 
number of illustrations. Since the visit to China by the former Indian 
prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in 2003, China and India have 
established joint study groups, initiated strategic dialogues, and pro-
moted their bilateral relations by celebrating the China–India Friend-
ship Year of 2006. An agreement on Sino–Indian energy cooperation 
was signed in 2006; joint anti-terrorism training exercises were con-
ducted in 2007; and several official visits by both countries’ leaders 
had taken place at the time of writing in 2015. Still, while these devel-
opments demonstrate a clear effort to maintain an active diplomatic 
engagement at the bilateral level, there are constraints in terms of 
competing geopolitical interests that profoundly affect China–India 
relations.  
Scholars also dispute India and China’s rising influence (Golub 
2013; Flemes 2013) under the South–South partnerships such as 
IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) and BRICS. Although the 
emerging powers’ “discursive alignment” through “social claims” of 
normative preferences (Mielniczuk 2013: 1078, 1087) may indicate 
the potential endurance of emerging powers’ South–South solidarity 
as a force in international politics, Nel and Taylor contend that such 
solidarity (in terms of IBSA) is “little more than a discursive veil” 
(Nel and Taylor 2013: 1107). It holds little political currency for 
emerging economies, especially India, to project through their global 
outreach to southern partners. Robert Wade (2011) also argues that 
the geopolitical shift in power in favour of the emerging economies, 
including India, has been much smaller than many had anticipated 
(also see Nel and Taylor 2013). The argument of some of these litera-
tures relies on the fact that while India and China, along with their 
southern partners, have succeeded in framing their partnership identi-
ty based on their common colonial and great civilisational and histor-
ical legacy vis-à-vis the North (or the West), they neither challenge 
nor do they present an alternative to the fundamental neoliberal archi-
tecture set by the Western powers. Scepticism also exists as to whether 
or not China’s assertiveness is premature or is only a social construct 
or an objective phenomenon (Suzuki 2014; Jerden 2014). 
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A Test of China–India Cooperative Dynamics 
within the BRICS Framework 
A serious test of the cooperation between China and India relates to 
the internal dynamics of the BRICS association, particularly with 
regard to the BRICS bank. On the one hand, the BRICS institutions 
serve as the mediative “voice” that strives to challenge a superpower’s 
[the United States’] ability to “waive the rules in order to rule the 
waves” (Prantle 2014: 481). Indeed, Leksyutina (2014) argues that 
consolidation of the BRICS initiative is a means for China to pave a 
way to global economic governance. Similarly, Abdenur writes, 
“From a geopolitical point of view, the BRICS helps China to coun-
ter US hegemony without direct confrontation” (2014: 92). On the 
other hand, BRICS is also transformative in the sense that it acts as 
an exit option in remedying distributive conflicts of power. That be-
ing said, scepticism was high at the initial stage about whether the 
BRICS association would sustain or would ultimately turn out to be 
“brics without mortar” (Stephens 2011). Since the idea of the NDB 
was introduced, pessimism surrounding the bank’s viability was fur-
ther escalated due to the project’s ambitiousness (Warner 2012; Yard-
ley 2012). Even Takehiko Nakao, president of the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, pointed to the BRICS capacity challenge in establishing 
the bank, saying,  
Setting up banking business is not easy as it involves finding new 
projects, financing them and then monitoring the use of these 
funds and repayments. (The Economic Times 2013)  
However, the BRICS nations were able to translate an ideational 
concept into delivery at the 2014 Fortaleza summit in Brazil with the 
creation of an initial USD 50 billion fund with equal stakes for each 
of the BRICS members. Furthermore, the BRICS economies also 
agreed to establish the Contingent Reserve Agreement (CRA), 
amounting to USD 100 billion to deal with any future financial crisis.  
The BRICS alliance’s ability to deliver a tangible result, however, 
did not come about without highlighting the sensitivity of the China–
India relationship. What was salient about this initiative was not only 
that it repositioned the defensive response of the two countries to the 
ascendancy of new informal (with a self-selected membership and no 
charter or physical site) in the wake of the global financial crisis, but 
also that it made prominent the differences, as well as the similarities, 
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between China and India’s approaches in a summit process in which 
they were both members.  
As with the G20, India’s initial response to the original four-
nation BRIC framework was caution. In the early stage of club devel-
opment, the Indian foreign minister played down the implications of 
the forum, saying,  
These four countries are not arranged against any other countries 
or any other group of countries. It is not even an effort to flex 
muscles. We are trying to learn from each other. (RT.com 2009)  
Even when the BRIC grouping was elevated to a leaders’ level sum-
mit at Yekaterinburg in June 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
took a low-key approach, a stance that could be contrasted with the 
high-profile championing of the alliance by Brazil’s president Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva.  
By 2011–2012, however, this cautious approach had subsided. 
Departing from the wary ambivalence it had displayed toward the 
G20, India took on the role of host nation for the fourth BRICS 
summit in New Delhi. Moreover, Prime Minister Singh pointed to a 
BRICS relationship that had moved beyond the function of a group-
ing to monitor the progress of the G20 to a forum with an autono-
mous agenda of its own. He said,  
The relevance of BRICS to the international order has increased 
over time […]. The agenda of BRICS has gone beyond the purely 
economic to include issues such as international terrorism, climate 
change and food and energy security. (Ministry of External Affairs 
2011) 
In terms of its repositioning from a largely defensive approach, In-
dia’s shift in institutional targeting came to the fore most dramatically 
through its ambitious form of entrepreneurial and technical leader-
ship with respect to its proposal for a “South–South” or development 
bank in March 2012. In contrast to the established pattern where 
India stood back while other countries did the running on an initia-
tive and its initial scepticism that the BRICS grouping could be a 
problem-solving body, in this case India jumped out to the front.  
The initiative, however, showcased the need for serious bargain-
ing within BRICS. It was clear from an early stage that Indian and 
Chinese interests were at odds. Xu Qinghong, section chief of the 
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banking supervision department at the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission noted:  
There are vast differences between us […]. Looking at the history 
of other multilateral institutions, I think such a feasibility study 
will take a long time and it may test our patience. Since the Delhi 
Summit, so far in China there have been a lot of doubts about a 
proposal. (Krishnan 2012)  
Despite these complications, Indian officials persisted with the initia-
tive. Up until the 2013 Durban summit, they pursued a plan whereby 
there would be an initial capital of USD 50 billion to launch the fund 
with each BRICS country making an equal contribution of USD 10 
billion. China, however, pushed for an alternative model bolstered by 
its advantage of holding massive international monetary reserves of 
well beyond USD 3 trillion. Its model encouraged contributions 
based on each country’s financial capacity and planned for an overall 
capital base of USD 100 billion. This model would provide China 
with an opportunity to contribute more to the bank’s capital base and 
thus, would give it an asymmetric power advantage within the NDB’s 
founding members (Sahu 2013).  
To complicate the situation further, before the 2012 Tokyo 
meeting of BRICS finance ministers, Xu Qinghong worried that 
“non-economic factors” might hinder the NDB’s establishment. 
Indeed, non-economic factors became the major driving forces dur-
ing the intensive bargaining between China and India in delineating 
the bank’s development. In response to China’s stance on the details 
of the bank, India was often wary of its unequal power relation with 
China and played defensive moves in response. For instance, there 
was speculation that China was willing to pay part of other BRICS 
members’ share of the bank’s starting capital to resolve initial funding 
problems. This action could potentially allow China to take a leading 
role in advancing its own political agenda. From an Indian perspec-
tive, such a move would further exacerbate India’s competitive rela-
tions with China. India’s legitimate concern was that China’s leading 
role would eventually make the bank more like other international 
financial institutions (IFI) where big members’ voting rights over-
shadow those of smaller members. To counterbalance China, India 
even contemplated the idea of opening up the bank’s membership to 
include advanced economies, whereby they would receive a minority 
stake (between 40 per cent and 45 per cent) as contributors. Such a 
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strategy would effectively prevent China from using its financial power 
to play the dominant role. 
A second contentious issue emerged when the BRICS members 
wanted to decide where the bank’s headquarters would be located. 
While not a major source of debate at the outset, the issue amplified 
as the initiative slowly took shape. China, India, and South Africa all 
wanted to host the institution. The physical location of the bank had 
the potential to give a symbolic, if not tangible, advantage to the host 
nation in relation to the bank. In its efforts to headquarter the bank, 
India maintained the impression that it remained the inspirational 
force behind the institution. Indian Prime Minister Singh reinforced 
this view in his statement at the Durban summit in 2013. He said,  
The ideas that we first discussed at New Delhi, that of instituting a 
mechanism to recycle surplus savings into infrastructure invest-
ments in developing countries, has been given a concrete shape. 
(The Economic Times 2013)  
However, India’s ideational inspiration did not easily translate into its 
physical ownership of the bank’s headquarters. While India wanted 
the headquarters for itself, China took the stand that the bank head-
quarters should be located in Shanghai. This position was champion-
ed in turn by China’s key think tanks. After the New Delhi summit, 
the Financial Research Center at Fudan University argued that “China 
should strive to become the headquarters of the BRICS bank” 
(Shanghai Forum 2013). 
Contestations about control later spilled over into the issue of 
which currency would be the bank’s functional currency. The memo-
randum of agreement signed at the New Delhi summit in 2012 
opened the way for BRICS member development banks to extend 
loans in their respective currency denomination. The process of mov-
ing away from the US dollar opened up speculation about Chinese 
control through the internationalised CNY, especially as China bene-
fitted from advocating the use of its own currency to offset currency 
risks in development finance. Indian finance ministry officials were 
reported to express the view that the bank’s goal had become a 
means of “legitimising” the use of Chinese currency overseas (The 
Times of India 2012).  
In spite of the tensions between China and India outlined above, 
the bargaining process, which ultimately led to the finalisation of the 
New Development Bank with its headquarters in Shanghai and its 
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first president an Indian national, appeared to consolidate the club 
culture among the BRICS members. Thus, the NDB, to echo Cheng’s 
argument (Cheng 2015: 364), is not only an example of institution-
building for the purpose of containing bilateral conflicts, but is also a 
means of enhancing their collective international influence.  
Moreover, the partnership extended under founding member-
ship of the AIIB, as well as economic cooperation under BRICS, 
brought India and China a step closer due to their overlapping inter-
ests in national financial security. India had endured an acute balance 
of payment crisis in 1990/1991 due to a combination of domestic 
factors and external shocks. Among the many lessons that India 
learned from that crisis – and from its Asian peers, including China, 
after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 – was the need to develop a 
large foreign reserve in order to weather a future financial crisis. 
However, domestic electoral politics based on populist agendas al-
lowed India little room to maintain a healthy balance of payment. 
Indeed, avoiding another balance of payment crisis remained a con-
stant headache for the new governor of the Reserve Bank of India, 
Raghuram Rajan. While the International Monetary fund (IMF) was 
India’s last-minute rescuer during its financial crisis in 1991, in return 
for which, India had to adopt neoliberal reforms, it was in India’s 
interests to have an alternative “safety net” in the form of the cur-
rency reserve for any future financial crises. Furthermore, a cash-
starved India has been in acute need of infrastructure investment to 
enable broader economic development and security. Meanwhile, Chi-
na needed to diversify its massive foreign reserve away from its in-
vestment in US Treasury bonds. Financing the NDB and the AIIB 
projects provided China with an alternative investment avenue that 
ultimately killed two birds with one stone: firstly, it helped to diversify 
China’s foreign reserve investment and further supplemented its for-
eign policy objectives; and secondly, the BRICS reserve currency pool 
of USD 100 billion furthered India and China’s cooperation on 
common financial interests.  
Perhaps then, it was no wonder that India’s prime minister, Nar-
endra Modi, hailed the NDB as a new chapter of cooperation for the 
BRICS members and further noted that it demonstrated “our capaci-
ty to set up institutions” (Zee News 2014; The Times of India 2014). The 
bank also showcased China’s ability to craft an initiative that fur-
thered its own ambitions. However, aside from common interests, 
  86 Andrew F. Cooper and Asif B. Farooq 

the level of cooperation witnessed between China and India in estab-
lishing the NDB was either not evident or was mixed at best on the 
issue of global financial governance in other multilateral fora. This 
raises questions about the possible spillover effect of cooperation 
“within the BRICS” to coordination “outside the BRICS framework.” 
China and India’s Approaches on the G20 
China’s Initial Caution towards the G20  
The elevation of the G20 to the leaders’ level was in many ways at-
tractive to China, as Chan argues, in that the G20 offered more op-
portunity than risk for China (Chan 2012: 198). The explicit structural 
need, and diplomatic request, for China to be a part of the summit 
process played well to Chinese status claims. Although part of the 
more generalised ascendancy of emerging powers generally and the 
BRICS specifically, China was accorded a special place in the for-
mation of the G20. “Quiet” diplomacy by the United States in man-
aging the financial/economic crisis was directed in good part towards 
China, to the point of putting the notion of a G2 into play. Although 
this inner group never took firm shape, China’s agreement to be part 
of the G20 served as a make or break moment for the immediate 
legitimacy, and the prospect of efficiency, for the overall summit 
design.  
By embracing the G20 from the outset, China put to rest the 
negative images of it as a revisionist country that is planning and 
actively working towards an overturn of the status quo (Mearsheimer 
2006: 160–162). Not only did China not place any conditions on its 
participation, its declaratory statements of “ascendancy” were muted. 
In comparison to Brazil for example, there was no sense of demand 
or satisfaction that China had moved beyond the status of “outreach” 
country to the G7/8.  
While China enjoyed de facto special status it did not take on 
this role in a public fashion. Its official status was no different to that 
of the other countries invited to attend the first G20 summit in 
Washington DC in November 2008. Indeed in strict hierarchical 
terms, when the G20 leaders were asked to speak by President 
George W. Bush on 15 November, it was the King of Saudi Arabia 
who took the lead-off position. Yet in symbolic terms, a key indicator 
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for such an informal hub institution, China stood out, as witnessed by 
the position of President Hu Jintao to the right of President Bush in 
the official picture of the G20.  
This mix of high informal status and formal equality also served 
China’s position in terms of the rest of the “developing” world. The 
fundamental danger for China was that it would be seen as joining a 
self-selected forum of the powerful, and thus would abandon its cre-
dentials as champion of the Global South. The mix of informal status 
and formal equality neatly got around this predicament. The entry of 
China into the G20 sent a signal to other countries that it was a power 
that mattered, without any redefinition of image or sense of isolation.  
The cautious approach adopted by China towards the G20 re-
flected this concern with flexibility. China in the initial stages of the 
G20 demonstrated that it was thoroughly onside with the G20’s 
agenda. Nonetheless, its major signals to this effect did not come in 
the actual G20 summits. Rather, policy announcements were made in 
parallel – and anticipatory – fashion. The first, and arguably the 
strongest, sign of this pattern came with the announcement by China 
of its massive stimulus package prior to the Washington DC summit. 
This was a pattern that continued. In the run-up to the June 2010 
Toronto Summit, the Chinese government tried to pre-empt pressure 
on the CNY by announcing the restart of exchange rate liberalisation.  
This focus on taking moves prior to the G20, though, also indi-
cated the limits of China’s engagement with respect to the G20. In 
part, this reflected the collective leadership culture. Ad hocery was 
not a part of the Chinese diplomatic script. Parallel and anticipatory 
announcements not only signalled a certain distance and autonomy 
from the G20 process, it also allowed strategic policymaking.  
When such parallelism and anticipatory actions were in accord-
ance with win-win outcomes, a two-way form of accommodation 
became part and parcel of the G20’s build up of momentum. China 
adapted itself to the operational methods of the G20, through its 
working groups, and the G20 accommodated itself to China’s partici-
pation, for example, by allowing it a large number of sous-Sherpas (in 
some meetings up to 40, which was a very different model from the 
more streamlined G7/8).  
When either indirect or direct demands were made on China, 
however, there was resistance. On one front, this defensive style fo-
cused on pushing back attempts to widen the agenda beyond the 
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crisis-committee agenda, moving the G20 past the financial crisis to 
an agenda that targeted issues such as development or climate 
change. This resistance was in large part due to concerns about losing 
autonomous decision-making. As Acharya writes, China’s defensive 
posture comes from its “desire not to sacrifice its sovereignty and 
independence for the sake of multilateralism and global governance” 
(Acharya 2011: 589). There were concerns as well about process, with 
the intrusion of the G20’s agenda into areas better suited to, and 
more legitimately, the purview of the UN. Style and substance thus 
met, as the strict compartmentalisation between the G20 and the UN 
reinforced China’s credibility with non-members of the G20, which 
had concerns about further G20 encroachment.  
Such concerns came out in repeated fashion. Just before the 
2009 London summit, for example, papers were put forward by Vice 
Premier Wang Qishan and the Central Bank governor, Zhou Xiao-
chuan, with Wang calling for the G20 to “look beyond the needs of 
the top 20” in how the international financial system (IFS) is run 
(Wang 2009). Indeed, Eccleston, Kellow, and Carroll (2015: 310) 
write that endorsement of trans-Atlantic cooperative initiatives in the 
G20 encountered obstacles from emerging economies, particularly 
China, because of fear of encroachment into national interests. In-
deed, China did not hesitate to assert itself in removing Hong Kong 
and Macau from the OECD’s list of tax havens during the 2009 Lon-
don summit (Watt et al. 2009; Lesage 2010). 
Chinese resistance was even more robustly aimed at issues that 
more directly targeted its policy space. An early and ongoing example 
was the attempted use of the G20 by the United States to deal with 
currency issues. The other main example was the attempted push on 
the question of trade imbalances. The ongoing activities of the G20 
then showcase a fundamental paradox in the global system’s core 
institutional architecture. The United States, as made apparent by 
issues such as currency and imbalances, wants to maintain some ele-
ments of the disciplinary culture associated with the G7/8. But, in 
terms of capacity, the United States no longer possesses the ability to 
change the policy space of other systemically important countries 
such as China on a coercive basis. Such shifts can only take place on a 
voluntary basis, where such moves are viewed as being in conformity 
with national, as well as international needs.  
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The effect of this governance gap has meant that China remains 
wary of some aspects of the G20 process. Yet, even with this circum-
scribed comfort level, China has moved to make strategic use of the 
G20. At one level, China has amplified the G20 as an operational 
means of conducting bilateral or plurilateral relations. Indian com-
mentators, for example, have commented how organised China has 
been in arranging bilateral meetings at the edges of the G20. The 
most striking illustration of this dynamic came with the deal between 
US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping im-
mediately before the November 2014 Brisbane G20 summit, in which 
China agreed to cap its greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 at the latest 
and to diversify its energy supply to include more non-fossil fuels. 
On the plurilateral side, China used the G20 meetings to build 
autonomous activity by the BRICS countries. If not the mobiliser of 
the BRICS as a summit process, as explained earlier, China was an 
important animator of the BRICS caucus meetings on the sidelines of 
the G20. Consistent with its own defensive approach, the main moti-
vation of this activity was explicitly instrumental, building up a coali-
tion of resistance against any G20 initiative, such as on currency valu-
ation and trade imbalances, that were deemed detrimental to its own 
national interests (Schirm 2013: 700–704).  
In terms of the G20 summit itself, China’s hedging instinct, that 
is its desire to keep its options open and not over-commit, has been 
maintained. Such an approach signifies that China increasingly sees 
the G20 as a means to an end or ends. Instrumentally, China remains 
committed to the G20 crisis-committee approach, but it is cautious 
about how wide it wants to go in areas of agenda-stretch that would 
take the G20 into steering committee territory. As one leading Chi-
nese expert argues: 
There is a tension between China’s desire for the G20 to be an ef-
fective body and its interest to preserve China’s independence 
over domestic affairs. This is the reason for China’s ambivalence, 
for example, over the mutual assessment mechanism that the G20 
powers agreed that the IMF would initiate after the Pittsburgh 
summit. China believes this mechanism should be consultative 
and instructive in nature, while others believe it should have more 
authority to intervene in order to help coordinate policies more 
effectively. (Chen 2011) 
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Where it is most active is in making sure its status claims are thor-
oughly embedded, above all in terms of Bretton Woods Institution 
(BWI) reform. Even here, though, there are constraints on how far 
China wants to move. China, for example, did not follow up on the 
Brazilian initiative on a BRICS rescue mission for the eurozone at the 
Cannes G20. Nor has China pushed for a candidate for the top jobs 
at either the IMF or the World Bank. Instead, it has focused most of 
its substantive attention on offering parallel initiatives on the devel-
opment agenda through BRICS that contrast with the G7/8’s own 
moves in these policy areas. Significantly, as part of this diplomacy of 
contrast, China has called for the G7/8 to keep up their own efforts 
at making sure that official development assistance (ODA) levels and 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are not altered. 
India’s Strategic Defensiveness and Functional
Innovative Capacity 
Far more so even than China, India stands out as a country that has 
made “saying no” its moniker in global affairs. As witnessed by its 
role in the World Trade Organization (WTO), India is ready to act as 
a blocker not only in tandem with other countries, but also on its 
own, if it feels that domestic constituencies are being hurt. In 2006, 
India’s commerce minister Kamal Nath stood up to pressure for a 
deal on the Doha Round, bluntly acknowledging that failure was 
better than a bad deal. Nath justified this uncompromising stance by 
reference to the interests of India’s poor (Beattie 2009). “They know 
I stand up for them,” he said, “That’s why they support me.” In 2013, 
at the Bali WTO Ministerial Conference, India again demonstrated a 
willingness to stop any result that did not allow the current ceiling on 
food subsidies to be raised at the national level. In an official release, 
trade minister Anand Sharma underscored that India’s concerns over 
food security were non-negotiable: “India’s public stockholding pro-
gramme for public distribution system cannot be compromised for 
minor gains of the developed countries” (GoI 2013). 
With this background in mind it is significant that India reacted 
in a “going along” fashion when the elevation of the G20 to the lead-
ers’ level took place in November 2008. While India did not overtly 
resist the move, by acting as a defector or strategic spoiler, it stood 
out for its combination of wariness and expectancy regarding status 
enhancement. Prime Minister Singh made it clear that the catalyst for 
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the meeting was the West, saying that the leaders’ meeting took place 
“against the backdrop of the financial crisis that has emanated in the 
United States and Europe” (GoI 2008). If concerned about the con-
tagion effect, Singh made no offer of any tangible form of collective 
action, accepting that the G20 potentially had “an important role to 
play in considering corrective measures to prevent future recurrence 
of such events” but that the deliberations involved issues that were 
“complex and will require sustained deliberation over a period of 
time” (GoI 2008).  
The sceptism about the immediate substantive effect, however, 
was joined by signals that India was an ascendant country with the 
right to take a more central position in the global system. While lever-
aging the crisis to gain advantage on a de facto basis through the 
G20, pointing out that “[his] participation in the Summit demon-
strates this changing landscape of the international economy,” Singh’s 
main game was to achieve both symbolic and tangible acceptance for 
“our views on the need for greater inclusivity” in the wider global 
system (Ministry of External Affairs 2008). At the core of this main 
game were the goals of not only reform of the BWIs, but also the 
accession of India as a permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC).  
India’s ambivalence about the pivotal role of the G20 manifested 
in operational terms when the summit process came into being. India 
was noticeably absent from the elaborate diplomatic web that preced-
ed the Washington summit. Instead of using the G20 as an oppor-
tunity to expand contacts, India framed the summit in technical 
terms, with the only major announcement being the selection of 
Montek Singh Ahluwalia, deputy chair of the planning commission, 
as Prime Minister’s Singh’s choice of representative. Although 
Ahluwalia was a highly competent official, his choice was very differ-
ent from that of Brazil and China, both of which appointed experi-
enced foreign policy hands (Antonio Aguiar Patriota and He Yafe, 
respectively) to this position. As Alagh (2012) elaborated, such an 
approach allowed India to take “like ducks to water in the consensus 
on pushing the Mutual Assessment Process to country-specific com-
mitments.” 
Nor did an expansive think tank/academic lobby grow up in In-
dia vis-à-vis the G20. In China, this type of mobilisation allowed both 
networks and trial balloon ideas to flourish. The Shanghai Institutes 
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for International Studies (SIIS), notably, took a lead role in creating 
big-picture intellectual and policy space for the G20, terming the G20 
an “indispensable body,” though one with lots of constraints (Wei 
2011).  
India relied far more on individual, far-sighted opinion-leaders, 
although it must be noted that the Indian Council for Research on 
International Economic Relations (ICRIER) put together a series of 
events around G20 themes starting with a conference on “Interna-
tional Cooperation in Times of Global Crisis: Views from G20 Coun-
tries” in September 2010. Whereas the Chinese SIIS was accorded the 
scope to analyse the geo-political implications of the G20, however, 
ICRIER stuck to a technical mandate with a prime focus on issues 
such as the scope and architecture of financial regulations, accounting 
standards and financial transparency, and global imbalances and the 
international monetary system.
Under these conditions, India adopted an approach dominated 
by a strategic wariness relating to its determination to keep the UN as 
its first best option. Rather than endorsing the G20 as the premier 
forum at a time of crisis, India’s representative (Minister of State 
Preneet Kaur) reiterated India’s traditional view about the salience of 
the “foundational” institutions:  
The United Nations provides a unique forum, with unparalleled 
legitimacy and inclusivity. This UN Conference on the World Fi-
nancial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development is 
only the second such gathering held of the United Nations on the 
financial and economic system and architecture, the first being the 
UN Conference on the Monetary and Financial System held in 
Bretton Woods in 1944 with the participation of all the then 44 
members of the UN. In that sense, this is a truly historic meeting. 
It is vitally important that this landmark event coupled with the 
UN’s convening power is used to hear the voice of the entire 
global community on the extraordinary crisis being faced by the 
global economy today. (Permanent Mission of India to the UN 
2009) 
In the statement, Kaur mentions India’s “active engagement” in the 
G20 along with the work of the forum “aimed at redressing the cur-
rent global economic situation so as to bring the global economy 
back to the trajectory of sustained growth.” However, her language 
reveals a high degree of both symbolic distancing and instrumental 
contingency. In contrast to the high degree of identification and label-
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ling of the UN, the G20 is referred to as “they.” This reflected a gen-
eralised scepticism on India’s part that the G20 lacked legitimacy to a 
certain extent, in that it was divorced from the larger group of devel-
oping countries.  
Although prominent officials such as Finance Minister P. Chid-
ambara argued that the G20 was a major improvement over the 
G7/8, there was a wariness about the G20’s ambitions. He said,  
I would have liked global oversight, not a global regulator; just an 
oversight mechanism to ensure that the national regulator and na-
tional authorities are implementing the action plan. (The Times of 
India 2008) 
Even while pointing to the G20’s strengths, he hedged his assess-
ment, stating,  
I don’t know whether the G20 will replace the G7 [...]. But I think 
the G20 will become the most important economic forum like 
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) to address the economic 
issues. (The Times of India 2008)  
The core diplomatic impulse was to lever the crisis, and the creation 
of the G20, into a wider set of institutional reforms that consolidated 
India’s position in terms of participation to formal organisations and 
amplified fairness in the global system. Shifting the debate from a 
problem-focused perspective about what India could do for a world 
under stress, the main theme of the address was what the world 
should do for India in terms of a multilateral catch up. These status 
concerns with an eye to making sure that India got the equitable re-
sult it deserved were buttressed, moreover, by apprehension about 
possible separate arrangements between the United States and China 
concerning the de facto formation of a G2 (Mohan 2013). What was 
needed, therefore, was a signal that the tenets of multilateral global 
governance would be strengthened, not by-passed:  
At the UN, the General Assembly must be revitalized along with a 
real reform of the Security Council […]. At the BWIs, the voice 
and quota reform needs to be accelerated so as to make these in-
stitutions both responsive and effective as well as credible and rele-
vant in continuing to play vital roles in global economic affairs. 
(Permanent Mission of India to the UN 2009) 
These core characteristics became consolidated in the follow-up G20 
summits. Without a strong sense of ownership of the G20, India was 
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content to focus on the spillover (transactional) advantages of be-
longing to the top-tier forum. The most significant of these benefits 
to India, as with China, was the ability to caucus and/or lobby jointly 
via the emerging BRICS grouping. Indeed, on an ad hoc basis, Prime 
Minister Singh moved ahead in using the G20 as a means to meet on 
a bilateral basis with other key leaders. At the April 2009 G20, Singh 
met one-on-one with both US President Barack Obama and UK 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown. At Pittsburgh in September 2009, 
Singh met again with Prime Minister Brown, as well as the leaders of 
Japan and Australia. At the Toronto G20 summit in June 2010, Singh 
met once more with President Obama and was a guest at a dinner 
hosted by the Canadian prime minister, Stephen Harper, at the end of 
the summit.  
In line with its functional bias, India built up its policy reach in 
low-key, but important, specialised areas. There were some aspects of 
this activity that used G20 initiatives as a catalyst for national action, 
as in the case of anti-corruption, where India pushed to introduce a 
bill in parliament, in March 2011, to criminalise foreign bribery. In 
other cases, however, it is the mix of entrepreneurial and technical 
elements that stand out. India most notably co-chaired, alongside 
Canada, the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced 
Growth Working Group – a leadership role that it has held since the 
Group’s launch at the 2009 G20 summit in Pittsburgh. 
The main concerns of India regarding the G20, however, re-
mained wariness over the spillover effects of the financial crisis and a 
new form of status-seeking, both individually and in combination 
with the alternative informal summit process within the BRICS. Both 
of these concerns were clearly evident at the 2012 G20 Los Cabos 
summit. In a departure from his usual low-key declaratory style, 
Prime Minister Singh went on the offensive to try to rein in the shift 
of approach in the West from stimulus to austerity. Terming the rela-
tionship between austerity and growth “contentious,” Singh argued 
that “synchronised austerity” across many countries is not the right 
approach when the growth impulse is weak (Srinivasan 2012).  
India’s elevated status-seeking was in some part a reflection of 
the comparative advantage it appeared to have in responding to the 
financial crisis. Up until 2013, India considered itself to be de-
coupled from areas that were harder hit. While not overly generous, 
India could still signal its reversal in fortunes from earlier decades by 
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pledging USD 10 billion to the IMF’s firewall for the eurozone. Such 
a commitment, however, was hugely overshadowed by China’s own 
commitment of USD 43 billion. 
Deeper participation in the G20 by India only came in 2013 at 
the St. Petersburg summit where it took up the issue of the US Fed-
eral Reserve’s tapering of quantitative easing policy (because of capi-
tal outflow and currency depreciation). What stood out about this 
closer form of engagement, though, was its reactive nature combined 
with components of a return to grandstanding. What India wanted, in 
addition to its ongoing bid to gain spillover reforms on the BWIs, 
was to use the G20’s collective identity to instrumentally defend its 
own position in the global economy. Whereas in the immediate after-
math of the “made-in-the-North” financial meltdown, in the period 
just after 2008, India was confident about the ability of its macroeco-
nomic policy to effectively deal with the crisis, by 2013, it was suffer-
ing from a creeping sense of concern about contagion.  
Do Recent Trends Reinforce Commonalities or 
Competitive Behaviour? 
From this examination, it is clear that the foundational starting points 
of both China’s and India’s approaches to the innovative informal 
institutions created by the 2008 crisis are based in the same cautious 
wait-and-see attitude. In both cases, though, a process of adaption 
took place. In India’s case, the most striking feature is the way that 
India’s role in both the G20 and the BRICS framework looked back 
to the priorities of the past: a privileging of the UN and a develop-
mental model that emphasised solidarity between India and the 
Global South. Although there was also a high degree of status-seek-
ing, in the case of the G20, this approach was not connected to any 
tangible form of output. Indeed, India’s major initiative was quickly 
transferred over to the BRICS in an autonomous institutional con-
text.  
The degree of learning in Indian diplomacy is thus quite limited. 
What India attempted to do through the BRICS was in large measure 
what it had aimed to do through other initiatives it had pushed in 
earlier eras. In tactical terms, India did not attempt to lever specific 
advantages out of the G20, whether to navigate a sustained initiative 
or to host the summit process.  
  96 Andrew F. Cooper and Asif B. Farooq 

In no way did India appear to see itself as an authentic owner of 
the G20. On the contrary, its identity as a club participant remained 
with the UN and other formal institutions. India continued to contest 
the legitimacy of the informal summit process. The G20 could be 
used instrumentally, but India showed no willingness to grant this 
forum validation beyond its purpose as a crisis-committee in the con-
text of the financial crisis.  
This ongoing wariness about the G20 came to the fore at the 
2015 Antalya G20. Whereas some other countries, including the host 
nation Turkey, wanted to expand the agenda to encompass issues 
beyond the ambit of a crisis committee, India held steadfastly in its 
resistance. Not only did Prime Minister Narendra Modi maintain that 
the G20 should be subordinated to the UN on the sustainable devel-
opment agenda, but his 10-point plan to combat terrorism privileged 
the UN as well (Arjun Singh 2015).  
Furthermore, India’s tighter engagement with the BRICS looks 
more tactical than strategic. Like the G20, albeit in an amplified fash-
ion, the BRICS association has allowed India to hedge its options. To 
begin with, the BRICS reinforced India’s credentials as a country that 
straddled the line between the developing world and the image of 
ascendancy. The push for the South–South development bank had an 
instrumental purpose for India in that it provided financial capital for 
critical domestic infrastructure development. Efficiency as a “new” 
insider, however, was subordinated to equality as a longstanding 
“outsider” in that India could re-claim its historical role as a cham-
pion of alternative forms and means of development, professing a 
strong embedded commitment to sovereign national development, 
even while seeking integration into the world economic system, with 
a shared vision of inclusive global growth combined with develop-
ment policy autonomy and rapid socio-economic transformation of 
individual nations. Concomitantly, it was much easier to act as a voice 
of grievance and to claim to represent the interests of all developing 
countries.  
By contrast, China’s adaptive process was far more dramatic. At 
one level, China was far more sensitive to the risks attached to G20 
membership in terms of policy commitments. As such, its defensive 
approach shifted quickly from a “going along” style to one that 
pushed back at specific initiatives in which there was perceived dam-
age to its material interests.  
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At another level, China was more comfortable in adapting to the 
ascendancy of informality. In part this was because China, as a UNSC 
permanent (P5) member, had already achieved a level at the apex of 
global authority that India lacked. In terms of application, moreover, 
China had a tactical acumen that was less evident in India’s case. Not 
only was China quick to react to pressures in the context of the G20, 
it was tenacious in countering India’s lead in terms of the BRICS 
bank.  
If clear in its assessment that its national interests were not at 
stake, China did not break from the dominant club culture of BRICS 
(with a focus on the issues of agreement among it membership). This 
approach demonstrates the Chinese leadership’s entrepreneurial cap-
acity, which was backed by a scale of resources that was absent in 
Indian case. In overall terms, this willingness to make concessions 
even when it has the power advantage indicates that a two-way social-
isation process has occurred: with the emerging power’s integration 
into the existing norm and then its influence in reshaping the norms 
from within, even though diverse preferences and limitations exist 
among the emerging powers themselves (Pu 2012).  
China’s shift toward an assertive leadership role, by taking on the 
hosting role for the 2016 Hangzhou G20, marks an even greater 
move away from its pattern of past passive engagement. This leader-
ship role came to the fore with China’s emphasis on a number of 
themes. One is the focus on inclusive growth with the aim of reduc-
ing inequalities and imbalances in global development. Another is the 
monitoring and facilitation of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development to foster synergy in global development cooperation. 
Still another is the championing of joint actions to support infrastruc-
ture investments (G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2015).  
As the agenda of the BRICS forum expands more explicitly into 
the security arena, the differences between China and India could 
become more explicitly apparent. What binds China and India to-
gether is a common defence of the principle of sovereignty. How-
ever, some nuances have appeared in their responses to Western 
intervention. Unlike China, for example, India did not take an oppo-
sitional stance on Syria, voting in favour of a 2012 resolution con-
demning the actions of the Syrian government. And, while India in a 
similar fashion to China, did not immediately criticise Russia for it 
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actions in either the Crimea or Ukraine, it did so in a slow and defen-
sive manner (Madan 2014).  
Whereas India has been cautious in animating any shift in BRICS 
towards a security orientation (although the temptation exists for 
India to insert the issue of its relationship with Pakistan into the 
BRICS forum), China has embraced some initiatives towards a non-
traditional agenda beyond national financial security. A key compo-
nent of this strategy is the linkage of the economic agenda driven via 
BRICS and the security agenda via the Shanghai Cooperation Organ-
ization (headquartered in Beijing). While the non-traditional security 
agenda has not been broad in the SCO, with issues such as labour 
and the environment left out, a concentrated focus has developed on 
regional terrorism and ethnic separation. The issue of energy security 
is also becoming central to the workings of the SCO. Indeed, one of 
the major incentives for India to become a part of the SCO is the 
attraction of gaining greater access to hydrocarbons in Central Asia.  
When Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared in 2016 that he 
warmly welcomed the invitation of the SCO to become a full mem-
ber on the basis that it enhanced connectivity, combated terror and 
created an environment for boosting trade by easing barriers, this 
move reinforced the impression that India was accepting China’s 
priorities. Furthermore, India was also involved in the joint BRICS-
SCO-EEU (Eurasian Economic Union) summit, following the July 
2015 BRICS summit in the Russian city of Ufa, which also consoli-
dated China’s ascendency by acting as a platform to promote China’s 
Silk Road Economic Belt. India’s privileged position at this meeting 
appeared to be reduced by the fact that Pakistan was also accepted as 
a member of the SCO (The Indian Express 2015). While Pakistan’s 
entry into the SCO was strongly supported by China, this move com-
plicated India’s position not only in terms of status competition, but 
also on instrumental issues pertaining to the non-traditional security 
agenda. On energy security, for instance, India has been wary of plans 
for a pipeline through Pakistan, preferring to support plans for alter-
native pipeline routes, including those that run through China.  
Conclusion  
The central purpose of this article is to provide value added in terms 
of an assessment of the approaches used by China and India towards 
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the G20 and BRICS. Although there are some common characteris-
tics, it is the differences in approach between the two countries that 
jump out. India remains in reactive mode, with a considerable focus 
on a traditional agenda focusing on status enhancement via reform in 
both the UNSC and IFIs. By contrast, China has the advantage of 
being able to take an adaptive and nuanced approach that has morph-
ed over time.  
The concentration on reform of formal institutions has distract-
ed India from going beyond a technical orientation on both the G20 
and the BRICS. To be sure, this has not prevented India from push-
ing forward with initiatives that meshed with this functional orienta-
tion, most notably the creation of the New Development Bank. Never-
theless, instead of winning kudos for India, this push demonstrated 
the limits of India’s agentic capacity, in that China was able to wrestle 
the leadership of the NDB away from India.  
Because of its wariness about stretching the ambit of the G20, 
and due to its inability to put a distinctive stamp on the BRICS, India 
has found its position compromised. In terms of hosting the G20, 
India has fallen behind China. Moreover, in the BRICS arena, India 
has found itself having to react as China has pushed ahead, linking 
BRICS to a wide array of other projects beyond the NDB, including 
the AIIB, the “One Belt, One Road” policy, the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization, and the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. In 
these efforts, China has demonstrated an agentic confidence, sup-
ported by a sheer scale of resources that have so far been unmatched 
by India and the other emerging powers. 
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